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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4396
This paper uses a growth diagnostics approach à la 
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (HRV) to identify 
the most ‘binding’ constraints to private sector growth 
in Mongolia – a small, low-income, mineral-rich, 
transition economy. The approach of applying the 
HRV methodology is useful in those cases where a 
lack of data prevents us from estimating shadow prices 
to identify the most ‘binding’ constraint to growth. 
We find that although Mongolia is not liquidity 
constrained and has grown rapidly in recent years, 
economic growth has been narrowly based. Investment 
has flowed mainly into a small number of firms 
This paper—a joint product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Department of the World 
Bank's East Asia and Pacific Regional Vice-Presidency and the Economic Policy Division of the Economic Policy and Debt 
Department of the PREM Network—was prepared as a background paper for the recent Country Economic Memorandum 
entitled "Mongolia - Sources of Growth" (Report No. 39009-MN dated July 26, 2007). Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at eianchovichina@worldbank.
org and sgooptu@worldbank.org. 
operating in mining and construction. The low level 
of private investment in sectors outside mining and 
construction has been due to low returns – a result of 
costly and unreliable transportation services; lengthy 
and complex transit procedures, including customs and 
trade rules; distortionary taxes; coordination failures, 
at both domestic and international levels; and growing 
corruption. Poor financial intermediation is also a 
problem that has kept the cost of finance high, although 
lower than in previous years. Alleviating these binding 
constraints will ensure that Mongolia maintains the path 
towards sustained, broad-based growth. 
 





























JEL classification: O10, O53  





                                                                          
* Elena Ianchovichina is a Senior Economist with the Economic Policy Unit of the Economic Policy and 
Debt Department, PREM Network, World Bank; email: eianchovichina@worldbank.org.  
§ Sudarshan Gooptu is a Lead Economist in the East Asia Region’s Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management (PREM) Sector Unit, World Bank; email: sgooptu@worldbank.org.  
ª The authors would like to thank David Dollar, Genevieve Boyreau, Cyrus Talati, Giovanna Dore, Shubham 
Chaudhuri, Arshad Sayed, Altantsetseg Shiilegmaa, and other members of the Mongolia country team for 
data, inputs, and helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper. The substance of the paper benefited from 
discussions with the Government of Mongolia. The authors appreciate and have incorporated comments by 
Vikram Nehru, Roberto Zagha and other participants of PRMED’s Technical Presentation series on earlier 
drafts of the paper. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of 
the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent.   2
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the span of fifteen years since 1995, Mongolia’s transition from a centrally planned to a 
market-based system has proceeded successfully, and the economy has grown rapidly in 
real terms at an average, annual rate of 6.3 percent. The transformation involved the 
implementation of fundamental economic reforms including price liberalization, 
privatization, opening the economy to foreign competition, and establishing market 
institutions. Macroeconomic policies have remained prudent, debt levels have become 
manageable,
1 and a freely floating exchange rate regime has been put in place. In addition, 
Mongolia’s transition was largely unhindered by widespread social or political unrest, 
although the young democracy is still being perfected. 
In the past ten years, Mongolia’s macroeconomic performance has been strong. Foreign 
direct investment – especially in mining and construction activities, and Mongolian 
workers’ remittances have increased significantly in recent years fuelling the observed 
high GDP growth. The average share of FDI in Mongolia’s GDP of 5.2 percent for the 10-
year period (1996-2005) was higher than the average for the East Asia region, and more 
than three times that for the low-income country group to which it belongs. The economy 
grew at a fast pace averaging 8.4 percent in the period 2004-06.  
The structure of the economy has, however, evolved in a manner where the sources of real 
GDP growth have become concentrated, and heavily dependent on mining and livestock, 
and employment generation has been elusive, despite having a young and educated labor 
force. In 2005, the mining sector directly accounted for 18 percent of GDP, 66 percent of 
industrial output, almost 76 percent of export earnings and 20 percent of Government 
revenue. The mining sector output has the potential to increase substantially over the next 
decade. It is projected to double or even triple from 2003 levels by 2010 provided large 
projects get development approvals and are successfully commissioned. Mongolia has 
consequently become increasingly dependent on a narrow range of exports, and vulnerable 
to commodity price shocks.  
Given these challenges, one may wonder whether Mongolia will be able to sustain its 
growth record in the coming years. What will it take for Mongolia’s real GDP growth to 
remain high in the next ten years? What are the key constraints to growth that must be 
addressed in the short to medium term to maintain economic growth? These are some of 
the questions that motivated this study and to answer them the paper applies the growth 
diagnostics approach postulated by Rodrik (2004a) and outlined in Hausmann, Rodrik, and 
Velasco (2005). Our approach of applying the HRV methodology is useful in those cases 
where data limitations prevent us from estimating shadow prices. For the diagnostics, we 
rely on an eclectic array of macro- and micro-economic techniques including country-level 
and firm-level comparisons, times series analyses, sector studies and investment climate 
surveys.  
                                                                          
1 The macroeconomic outlook however remains somewhat vulnerable to risks that need to be monitored and 
managed effectively.   3
Our approach sets the paper apart from others which typically rely on a single technique 
such as growth regressions, times series analysis or macroeconomic models to identify 
bottlenecks to economic growth at the macro level or microeconomic analyses at the firm 
level.
2 These mechanistic techniques are often applied to different countries, but as noted 
in Leipziger and Zagha (2006) and World Bank (2005), the fact that countries differ in 
history, institutions, resources, initial distortions and other initial conditions implies that 
customization in the diagnostic is key. Most papers also do not attempt to prioritize the 
areas in need of intervention. Given the difficulty of quantifying second-best effects of 
reform, this paper attempts to identify the most ‘binding’ constraints to aggregate 
economic growth, in order to ensure that policy interventions to relax these constraints 
have sizable positive, first-best effects that more than compensate any possible negative, 
second-best effects. 
Finally, the paper differs from many of the recent policy analyses in resource-rich 
countries that are now facing windfall gains from soaring mineral prices in international 
markets. These studies have looked at issues related to overall macroeconomic 
management, efficiently managing these exhaustible mineral resources and the revenues 
they generate, so as to avoid “Dutch Disease” effects and hoping that the situation does not 
degenerate into a “resource curse”—something that, as history has shown, a majority of 
countries have faced with only a few exceptions (Chile and Finland, for instance). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytic framework for growth 
diagnostic analysis, and discusses data and techniques appropriate for this type of analysis 
in the case of a low-income, transition economy. Section 3 applies the framework in the 
case of Mongolia. Section 4 presents concluding remarks and caveats.   
2. METHODOLOGY 
The growth diagnostic approach of Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) is grounded on 
the standard economic theory. To illustrate this we start with the simplest Ramsey-type 
optimal growth model.
3 In theory, this model assumes that households have perfect 
foresight and need to decide how much labor and capital to rent to firms, and how much to 
save or consume by maximizing their individual utility: 




t s dt s t z c u U )) ( exp( ) (   ,        ( 1 )    
subject to a budget constraint: 
                                                                          
2 For example, recently, Loayza et al. (2005) use a cross-country growth model to study economic growth in 
Latin America and the Caribbean; Jayaraman and Choong (2006) use cointegration tests to identify growth 
constaints in Fiji; Thanoon et al. (2005) employ a three-gap model to demonstrate a sharp trade-off between 
investment and capacity utilization under foreign exchange constraints; and Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian 
(2007) rely on benchmarking to identify first order bottlenecks in Africa. Examples of recent micro level 
growth studies include Palmade (2005), and Verme (2006). 
3 The simplest form of the optimal growth model was developed by Ramsey (1928) to determine optimal 
level of saving.   4
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where c is consumption per capita, n is population growth, k is capital per worker, a is 
technological progress, θ is index of externality, x is availability of complementary factors 
of productions, such as infrastructure or human capital, z is the rate of time preference.  
 
Firms maximize profits at each point in time and use the production function f(.) in (2) to 
produce a single good. In their production function, technology is exogenous, and so are 
the complementary factors of production and the index of externality. First-order 
conditions for profit maximization imply that: 
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The government spending requirements are assumed to be fixed exogenously, the 
government imposes a tax on the rental price of capital, so the after-tax return to capital is 
r(1-τ). Maximization of (1), subject to (2), (3) and (4), and carried out by setting up a 
Hamiltonian results in the following condition: 









,       ( 5 )  
which holds in the case of balanced growth equilibrium. In this equation, σ is the inverse of 
the negative of the elasticity of marginal utility, and ρ=z+n is the real interest rate.  
 
Equation (5), also known as the “Euler equation” or “Keynes-Ramsey rule”, is the starting 
point for our analysis of binding constraints to growth as it captures many of the most 
important factors affecting growth of an economy in the short run, as well as those that 
matter for sustained growth in the future. If ρ is high, for any return on investment, 
investment is low and the economy is considered liquidity constrained. If r is low, for any 
cost of capital, investment is low and the economy is considered inefficient. 
 
The cost of finance ρ may be high because the country has limited access to external 
capital markets or because of problems in the domestic financial market. A country may 
have difficulties accessing external capital markets for a variety of reasons including high 
country risk, unattractive FDI conditions, vulnerabilities in the debt maturity structure, and 
excessive regulations of the capital account. Bad local finance may be due to low domestic 
saving and/or poor domestic financial intermediation. 
 
Return to capital r may be low due to insufficient investment in complementary factors of 
production, such as infrastructure and human capital, low land productivity due to poor 
natural resource management, or low private returns to capital due to high taxes, poor 
property rights, corruption, labor-capital conflicts, macro instability, and market failures, 
such as coordination externalities and learning externalities affecting negatively the 
country’s ability to adopt new technologies.  
                                                                          
4 Although in principle we could allow households to borrow from each other in the aggregate, private debt 
must always be equal to zero, and wealth accumulation is equivalent to capital accumulation.    5
 
The data needed to empirically estimate (5) are not available in most low-income 
countries, in general, and in a transition economy like Mongolia
5 in particular. Therefore, 
an application of the Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) framework requires one to 
analyze carefully each group of factors that affects the rate of return or the cost of capital 
and represents a branch of the “growth diagnostic tree” (Figure 1) in order to select the 
‘most’ binding constraints to private sector investment and entrepreneurship in a country. 
 
It is important to note that governments face other important welfare improving objectives, 
for instance, improving social safety nets and addressing other social concerns including 
environmental problems but these may not be necessarily or directly related to country’s 
growth priorities in the short-term.
6 While this growth diagnostics methodology seems 
simple, in practice as cited in Leipziger and Zagha (2005) it is “a disciplined art” that 
requires in-depth knowledge of the Mongolian economy.   
 
Recent economic growth literature suggests that when constraints are “binding”, they 
result in activities that are designed to get around them.
7 Symptoms that one sees under 
these circumstances include: high taxes; high degree of informality in economic activities; 
poor legal institutions; high demand for informal mechanisms of conflict resolution and 
enforcement; poor financial intermediation; and internationalization of finance through 
business groups/connected lending operations; among others.  
 
In applying the growth diagnostic methodology to the case of Mongolia we rely both on 
direct and indirect evidence to identify “bottlenecks” to economic growth. In addition, 
since the aggregate picture typically hides important details at the industry level, we use 
aggregate as well as industry and firm-level data. With the exception of livestock herding, 
the official GDP statistics on which we rely do not capture the activities of Mongolia’s 
large and growing informal sector, which produced output equivalent to 18 percent of 
GDP
8 and employed as much as 35 percent of Mongolia’s working-age population in 
2005,
9 compared to 20 percent in the early nineties. Official export data understate the 
importance of cashmere exports since a large share of raw cashmere gets smuggled to 
China every year.
10 The rise of artisanal mining activities implies a downward bias in 
statistics of output and employment in the mining sector (World Bank 2003).
  
                                                                          
5 Consistent data series prior to Mongolia’s 1993 transition are unavailable for most key variables and at the 
desired level of disaggregation. 
6 Economic growth is also influenced by religious, cultural, social conditions and beliefs. These factors while 
not explicitly part of the growth diagnostic framework can be addressed successfully through effective 
implementation of judicial laws. Examples from the countries in Central and Eastern Europe which joined 
the EU in recent years suggest that harmonization of legal frameworks is as an effective way of addressing 
differences including those stemming from religion and culture.  
7 See Hausmann, Rodrik, Velasco (2005) and Rodrik (2004a and 2004b). 
8 Source: World Bank (2006a). 
9 Authors’ estimates based on data from the Government of Mongolia that indicate an increase of 23 percent 
in the number of “non-employed” people and a forty percent decline in registered unemployed.  
10According to World Bank (2003) in 2002 over 38 percent of the raw cashmere produced was smuggled to 
China.   6
Benchmarking the performance of an economy is a way to identify factors that hold private 
investment in a country low.
11 Since benchmarking for growth diagnostics is done with the 
objective of identifying the key constraints to private investment and growth, it is 
important to select an appropriate group of comparator countries. The core group of 
comparators must consist of countries that share similar characteristics with the country of 
interest, and are at a similar stage of development, but it should also include good 
performers in the region, as well as regional averages for countries in different income 
groups.  The group of comparators however can vary depending on the question one needs 
to address. For example, when one would like to assess whether the cost of capital is high 
in a country, the group of comparators must include countries with similar credit 
worthiness ratings. When addressing questions about logistics and transport costs, the 
group of comparators must include land-locked countries with similar types of traded 
goods.  
 
While useful for identifying problem areas, benchmarking for growth diagnostics has 
limitations and should be used with caution. Comparisons in benchmarking exercises are 
meaningful only if the indicators are constructed following procedures that are consistent 
across countries. It is therefore important to use databases that are transparently 
documented in terms of data sources and data construction methods. A change in the set of 
comparator countries for an indicator may change the conclusions from a benchmarking 
exercise, suggesting that benchmarking should be used jointly with other methods to shed 
light on constraints to growth. Evidence that a country ranks low on a given indicator does 
not imply that the area is a ‘binding’ constraint to growth. There are countries that rank 
very low in terms of corruption, for instance, but have booming economies. Finally, 
economists should be aware of what the indicators used in benchmarking exercises 
measure and how they are constructed. This is especially important for indicators that 
proxy difficult to measure aspects of the business environment. 
 
Benchmarking is only one approach to identifying the key factors constraining private 
investment in a country. A thorough growth diagnostics exercise necessitates other 
methods including analyses based on macroeconomic, investment climate and trade data, 
industry studies, and other sources. This type of in-depth growth analysis is presented here 
in the case of Mongolia and can be used as an example of “how to” of growth diagnostics 
in the context of other low income countries. Next section lays out the steps we follow to 
formulate a growth diagnosis. 
                                                                          
11 Benchmarking, initially used only in industry, is now widely applied in many areas. Benchmarking the 
investment climate, for instance, involves comparing different aspects of a country’s investment climate with 
those of their competitors. Benchmarking is also used in order to identify the potential for productivity 
improvements, for instance, that of labor productivity. Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) also use 
benchmarking to identify binding constraints.  
7
 
Figure 1: Growth Diagnostic Tree adapted from Hausmann et al. (2005)  
Problem: Low levels of private investment and entrepreneurship 
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management3. THE  DIAGNOSTICS FOR MONGOLIA 
3.1 Is private investment in Mongolia low? 
Gross domestic investment in Mongolia has been high by international standards. In the 
past ten years gross domestic investment in Mongolia averaged 34.5 percent of GDP 
(Table 1). This average investment-to-GDP ratio was comparable to the average 
investment ratio in the East Asia region, and was much higher than the average 
investment ratio in the low income countries as well as land-locked, resource-rich 
countries in Central Asia.  
 
However, the majority of investment in Mongolia was funded by foreign funds, mostly 
foreign aid. The share of foreign aid in gross domestic investment averaged 60 percent in 
the past ten years (Table 1). In 2004 this share was approximately 4 times the share in 
low income countries. Domestic investment has grown slightly, but is a minor share in 
total investment (Figure 2). The small share of domestic investment implies that the 
economy is dependent on foreign funds which are uncertain by nature, and may decline 
substantially if global demand for commodities slumps. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) grew at a rapid pace in the past ten years. As a share of 
GDP FDI rose from 1.4 percent in 1996 to 10.4 percent in 2003 before it fell down to 5.8 
percent in 2004, but recovered to 9.8 percent in 2005. The average share of FDI for the 
ten year period was 5.2 percent of GDP and was higher than the average of East Asia and 
more than three times the average of low income countries (Table 1). Most of foreign 
direct investment however was attracted by a single sector – mining.
12 The share of FDI 




The bulk of private investment in Mongolia went into a limited number of sectors –
mining and construction, and into a very small number of firms operating in these 
sectors.
14 In 2004 investment in the construction and mining sectors accounted for nearly 
60 percent of investment in Mongolia (Table 2). Investment in the mining sector alone 
accounted for 15 percent of total investment, 33 percent of investment in machinery, 
equipment and tools, 59 percent of private investment, and a large share of foreign 
investment. 
 
                                                                          
12 Some FDI went into the service sectors, but a large portion of it was low quality investment made by 
individuals rather than companies (Source: Mr. Otgonbat, Vice Chairman of Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Trade Agency.) 
13 Foreign direct investment in mineral and petroleum exploration and development activities expanded 
from US$148 million in 2004 to US$191 million in 2005. 
14 In 2004 private firms operating in mining and construction were 0.7 percent and 2.7 percent of all private 
firms, respectively. A large number of Mongolian private firms provided wholesale and retail trade services 
(40 percent), and utilities, social sector services, and public administration services (32.9 percent). 
Manufacturing firms represented only 5.7 percent of all private firms, private agricultural firms – 5.1 
percent, hospitality firms – 3.2 percent, transport – 2.1 percent, financial real estate and business – 7.5 
percent.   9
Table 1. Gross capital formation, national and foreign savings 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average 
Foreign savings in 
Mongolia  3.1  -9.8  7.7  5.7 7.4 6.1 9.4 7.2  -3.9 0.3  3.3 
National savings 
Mongolia  26.8  37.9  27.5  31.3 28.8 30.0 22.8 30.8 40.4 35.2  31.1 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)          
 Mongolia  29.9  28.1  35.2  37.0 36.2 36.1 32.2 38.0 36.5 35.5  34.5 
 Cambodia  14.5  14.8  11.7  17.4 16.9 18.7 20.1 25.2 25.8  ..  18.3 
 Vietnam  28.1  28.3  29.0  27.6 29.6 31.2 33.2 35.4 35.6  ..  30.9 
 Azerbaijan  29.0  34.2  33.4  26.5 20.7 20.7 34.6 53.2 53.5  ..  34.0 
 Kazakhstan  16.1  15.6  15.8  17.8 18.1 26.9 27.3 25.7 26.3 27.5  21.7 
 Kyrgyz republic  25.2  21.7  15.4  18.0 20.0 18.0 17.6 11.8 13.8 20.4  18.2 
 Uzbekistan  29.2  21.7  20.2  17.5 16.3 19.6 20.3 20.2 24.5 25.1  21.5 
 Ghana  21.2  24.8  23.1  20.9 24.0 26.6 19.8 22.9 27.9 29.6  24.1 
 Uruguay  15.2  15.2  15.9  15.1 14.0 13.8 11.5 13.1 13.3  ..  14.1 
 East Asia and Pacific  36.5  34.8  30.8  29.5 29.9 30.8 31.5 33.1 34.4  ..  32.4 
 Low Income Countries  20.9  21.1  20.8  21.9 21.3 21.5 21.9 22.3 23.0  ..  21.6 
Foreign aid (% of gross capital formation)           
 Mongolia  56.9  84.9  59.5  66.4 63.5 57.8 57.1 51.4 44.3  ..  60.2 
 Cambodia  82.9  65.8  92.4  45.2 64.6 59.3 59.2 46.5 38.0  ..  61.5 
 Vietnam  13.6  13.1  14.9  18.0 18.2 14.2 11.0 12.6 11.4  ..  14.1 
 Azerbaijan  10.5 13.6  8.1 14.0  12.8  19.7  16.2  7.8  3.8  ..  11.8 
 Kazakhstan  3.7  4.1  6.4  5.8 5.7 2.5 2.8 3.4 2.3  ..  4.1 
 Kyrgyz republic  50.1  62.5  94.2  125.8 78.4 69.0 65.8 88.1 84.9  ..  79.9 
 Uzbekistan  2.2  4.4  5.2  5.2 8.3 6.9 9.6 9.5 8.3  ..  6.6 
 Ghana  44.3  28.9  40.7  37.9 50.3 45.6 53.3 54.7 54.9  ..  45.6 
 Uruguay  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3  ..  0.9 
 East Asia and Pacific  1.5  1.3  1.9  2.1 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7  ..  1.4 
 Low Income Countries  14.6  12.1  12.8  10.9 11.0 11.9 13.4 13.3 11.9  ..  12.4 
FDI (% of GDP)                 
 Mongolia  1.4 2.4 2.0 3.3  5.7  4.2  7.0  10.4  5.8  9.8  5.2 
 Cambodia  8.4  5.9  7.8  6.6 4.0 3.9 3.6 1.9 2.7  ..  5.0 
 Vietnam  9.7  8.3  6.1  4.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.6  ..  5.4 
 Azerbaijan  19.7 28.1 23.0 11.1  2.5  4.0  22.3  45.1  41.0  ..  21.9 
 Kazakhstan  5.4 6.0 5.2 9.4  7.0  12.8  10.5  6.8  9.5 ..  8.1 
 Kyrgyz republic  2.6 4.7 6.6 3.6  -0.2  0.3  0.3  2.4  3.5 ..  2.6 
 Uzbekistan  0.6  1.1  0.9  0.7 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.2  ..  0.8 
 Ghana  1.7  1.2  2.2  3.2 3.3 1.7 1.0 1.8 1.6  ..  2.0 
 Uruguay  0.7  0.6  0.7  1.1 1.3 1.5 1.4 3.7 2.4  ..  1.5 
 East Asia  3.9  4.0  4.1  3.3 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.5  ..  3.2 
 LICs  1.3  1.5  1.3  1.2 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4  ..  1.4 
Source: World Bank (SIMA) 
Domestic private investment has increased in importance, but in 2004 its share in total 
investment was still relatively small and only one third of private domestic investment 
was financed by bank loans (Table 3). Although domestic credit to the private sector has   10
been growing at high rates,
15 the vast majority of bank loans has been short term and has 
financed wholesale and retail trading activities, not investment projects.
16 
Table 2:  Composition of Total Investment, 2001-04 (Percentage share of total investment)  
  2001 2002 2003 2004
Construction   29.3 34.9  40.6  41.9
Machinery, equipment and tools  44.9 50.6  49.1  46.3
  o/w mining  14.8 11.2  9.1  15.4
Others 25.8 14.5  10.3  11.8
Source: Mongolian Statistical Yearbook (2004). 
Table 3:  Domestic Investment in Mongolia, 2001-2004 
Investment 2001 2002  2003  2004
  Government (% of domestic investment)  38.0 37.2  36.1  35.5
  Private domestic (% of domestic investment)  62.0 62.8  63.9  64.5
  Private domestic (% of investment)  21.6 22.7  23.3  26.4
  Bank loans (% of private domestic investment)  16.5 30.3  30.6  31.9
  Own funds (% of private domestic investment)  83.5 69.7  69.4  68.1
  Bank loans (% of investment)  3.6 6.9  7.1  8.4
 Source: Mongolian Statistical Yearbook (2004). 
Hence, the question that follows from this is whether private investment outside the 
mining and construction sectors has been low because of high cost of capital or due to 
low rates of return. This is critical if one needs to ensure that Mongolia’s future growth 
and employment generation is broad-based. 
3.2 Is the cost of capital in Mongolia high? 
Although nominal deposit rates remained stable and high in the period 2001-2005, real 
lending rates came down from 30 percent in 2001 to 11 percent in 2005 (Figure 3).
17 This 
drop in the real cost of capital was due mostly to a rise in the rate of inflation, rather than 
a decline in the risk premium (Figure 4). In the absence of any changes to the deposit rate 
and the risk premium, a drop in inflation from 13 percent in 2005
18 to 4.5 percent in 2006 
is likely to reverse the decline in the real lending rate and result in an increase in the real 
cost of capital above 15 percent. Indeed, real deposit and lending rates have risen 
significantly as inflation declined in 2007 (confirm what happened to inflation in 2007). 
                                                                          
15 According to the International Monetary Fund (2005) private credit grew at a rate of more than 200 
percent in 2002 and 2003, and 33 percent in 2005. In 2005 domestic credit to the private sector was close to 
40 percent of GDP- higher than domestic credit to the private sector in low income countries, but lower 
than domestic credit in Vietnam, and the average for the middle and high income countries. 
16 Source: World Bank (2006b) and Fitch Ratings (2006). 
17 The real lending rate is defined as the rate charged on loans to prime customers on loans of any maturity.  
18 In 2005 inflationary pressures in Mongolia were much higher than those in comparator countries such as 
Vietnam, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., and Uruguay.   11
3.2.1 Is the nature of international finance the reason for the high cost of capital?   
The reasons for the high cost of capital in Mongolia cannot, however, be traced to 
inadequate or expensive international finance. Mongolia’s official debt is primarily 
concessional, long-term debt. The share of concessional debt in total external debt 
averaged 85 percent over the past ten years, and is much higher than the average for low 
income countries (51 percent) and East Asia (20 percent) (Table 4). Mongolia continues 
to have little trouble obtaining concessional finance as the levels of these external inflows 
have remained relatively stable over the past decade. In December 2005, concessional 
loan agreements have been entered into with China, and South Korea, among others. 
Significant additional grant financing over the next few years is expected. 
Figure 2:  Domestic investment is on the rise in 
Mongolia… 
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Figure 4:  Real cost of capital has declined 
primarily due to increase in the inflation rate 
rather than declines in the risk premium. 
 
Figure 5:  Cost of capital is high because of high 
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Inward FDI was high in Mongolia (at 9.8 percent of GDP, compared with the median of 
only 1.7 percent for Fitch’s ‘B’ rated countries).
19 Rising official reserves and 
commercial bank assets helped push the 2006 liquidity ratio to over 600 percent (notably 
higher than the comparable Fitch’s ‘B’ country group median of 170 percent).  
                                                                          
19 Insurers in the Fitch’s ‘B’ peer group are viewed as weak with a poor capacity to meet policyholder and 
contract obligations.   12
Table 4:  External Finance in Mongolia is not Costly 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Period 
Average 
External debt (% of GNI)               
Mongolia  45.8  58.3  74.7  102.4 96.0  87.2  93.1  116.6 94.7  85.4 
Cambodia  68.9 70.2 80.5 73.5 74.4 73.9 74.1 75.3 72.5 73.7 
Vietnam  108.2  82.6 84.1 82.0 41.7 39.0 38.7 40.6 40.1 61.9 
Azerbaijan  14.1 12.9 16.0 23.7 27.2 24.2 25.6 25.5 25.4 21.6 
Kazakhstan 14.0  18.7  27.9 37.5 72.5 70.8 73.3 78.2 85.1  53.1 
Kyrgyz  republic  63.6  78.7  96.1  147.7 142.1 117.5 119.5 109.2 99.3  108.2 
Uzbekistan  17.1 19.9 22.5 29.1 34.1 43.4 50.1 50.1 42.0 34.3 
Ghana  85.3  84.6  86.2  85.1  126.6 121.9 115.4 101.2 80.0  98.5 
Uruguay  29.4 31.1 34.8 35.8 40.0 53.2 87.3 106.4  97.7 57.3 
East Asia & Pacific  33.4  34.3  38.4  35.3 29.7 28.9 25.9 24.0 22.5  30.3 
Low income countries  53.2  48.8  51.1  48.0 44.8 41.7 41.4 39.4 35.6  44.9 
Concessional debt (% of total external debt)               
Mongolia  76.2 81.7 87.0 89.6 91.2 91.5 90.3 76.3 85.2 85.4 
Cambodia  90.8 90.5 90.5 90.2 88.2 88.4 88.9 89.3 89.0 89.5 
Vietnam  75.8 15.3 20.0 24.0 61.3 66.4 72.4 73.9 71.4 53.4 
Azerbaijan  14.7 23.2 23.3 28.3 29.4 35.4 46.1 53.8 57.7 34.7 
Kazakhstan 4.4  4.1  4.4 6.5 3.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.8 
Kyrgyz  republic  32.3 34.6 41.9 46.1 48.2 56.6 62.5 68.0 74.5 51.6 
Uzbekistan  25.9 27.1 28.7 26.6 30.4 30.1 32.7 35.6 37.6 30.5 
Ghana  62.9 65.7 68.1 70.7 73.3 70.4 71.7 75.0 74.3 70.2 
Uruguay  3.6 3.5 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.6 
East Asia & Pacific  19.2  14.1  17.7  20.0 20.9 19.3 21.2 22.3 22.1  19.6 
Low income countries  49.4  45.8  47.5  49.4 49.0 50.2 52.9 56.9 56.4  50.8 
Short-term debt (% of total external debt)                 
Mongolia  0.9 4.2 3.9 2.4 1.4 1.6 4.3 19.4  11.0  5.4 
Cambodia  4.5 5.2 5.5 6.0 8.6 8.3 7.5 7.1 7.8 6.7 
Vietnam  14.3  10.8  9.8 10.2  7.2 6.2 5.9 8.1 12.0  9.4 
Azerbaijan  3.5 0.8 0.2 2.7 11.6  7.9 5.5 5.9 6.9 5.0 
Kazakhstan 7.6  8.6  7.0 7.7 7.7  9.0 10.7  12.5  11.1  9.1 
Kyrgyz  republic  0.8 2.5 1.9 3.5 7.1 2.8 1.0 1.9 0.4 2.4 
Uzbekistan  3.8  14.5 4.4  12.7 6.1  10.4 6.9  4.4  3.6  7.4 
Ghana  11.2  11.7  11.3  11.0  9.4 8.7 8.5 9.2 10.0  10.1 
Uruguay  28.2 28.5 26.5 24.0 23.5 30.3 15.1 12.6 16.0 22.7 
East Asia & Pacific  26.1  25.1  15.9  13.5 12.6 20.5 22.7 26.0 29.7  21.3 
Low income countries  11.8  10.7  10.0  10.0  8.0  7.8  7.5  7.6  8.5  9.1 
Source: World Bank (SIMA); Data for 2005 were not available. 
3.2.2 Is the nature of  local finance the reason for the high cost of capital? 
Looking at the cost and access to domestic financing, domestic savings have fluctuated a 
lot during the past decade, but on a trend basis have increased substantially in the past 
few years. As a share of GDP, domestic saving fell from 19 percent in 2001 to 11 percent 
a year later,
20 but increased to 25 percent in 2004, and rose again slightly thereafter 
(Table 5). Although low compared to saving in East Asian countries, the average ratio of 
                                                                          
20 The fall in domestic saving in 2002 reflected the shock of bad weather to agriculture.   13
domestic saving to GDP in Mongolia for the period 1996-2005 (22 percent) is higher than 
the average for low income countries with comparable interest spreads between deposit 
and lending rates (Tables 6 and 7). 
Table 5:  Gross Domestic Savings  (% of GDP) 
  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  Period 
Average 
Mongolia  22  34 22 23 21 19 11 18 25  26  22 
Cambodia  -4  3 -1  4  5 11 12 16 15 ..  7 
Vietnam  17  20 22 25 27 29 29 27 28 ..  25 
Azerbaijan  3  10  2 13 21 24 27 30 30 ..  18 
Kazakhstan  15  13 11 20 26 26 27 31 35  37  24 
Kyrgyz  republic  -1  14 -6  3 14 18 14  5  4 0  7 
Uzbekistan  23  19 20 17 19 20 22 27 32  33  23 
Ghana  13  4  10 3 5 7 8  11 8  11  8 
Uruguay  15  15 15 14 12 12 13 15 15 ..  14 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
37  37 36 34 34 34 35 37 38 ..  36 
Low income 
countries 
18  18 17 18 20 20 20 20 20 ..  19 
Source: World Bank (SIMA). 
Table 6:  Interest Rate Spreads (lending minus deposit rate), 1996-2005 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  2005 
 
Mongolia  43.2 45.7 19.3 15.9 15.9 15.9 15.2 12.3  11.2  10.6 
Cambodia  10.0 10.4 10.5 10.2 10.5 12.1 13.7 16.5  15.8  15.4 
Vietnam  20.1 5.9 5.2 5.3 6.9 4.1 2.6 2.9  ..  3.9 
Azerbaijan  ..  ..  .. 7.4 6.8  11.2 8.7 5.9  6.5  8.5 
Kyrgyz  republic  28.3  9.8 37.7 25.3 33.5 24.8 18.9 14.1  22.6  20.8 
Uruguay  43.5 37.6 31.6 28.5 27.8 27.0 55.8 29.3  17.5  10.8 
East  Asia  &  Pacific  6.1 6.2 5.6 5.9 6.9 5.9 5.9 5.9  6.3  5.5 
Low  income  countries  11.5 10.6 12.7 12.7 12.9 13.7 13.0 12.4  11.9  11.0 
Low  &  middle  income  8.7 8.4 9.3 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.6 8.2  7.4  7.3 
Middle  income  countries 7.6 7.4 7.7 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.2 7.1  6.5  6.5 
High  income  countries  3.9 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.1  ..  ..  .. 
World  7.2 7.0 7.6 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.2 7.1  6.5  6.5 
Source: World Bank (SIMA); Note: Data for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ghana were not available. 
 
This increase in domestic saving has been due to the strong GDP growth and balance of 
payments position of Mongolia over the past few years. These, in turn, have been due to 
favorable terms of trade, new mining operations, strong tourism revenues, remittances 
from abroad, and robust capital flows in the mining sector.
21 Indeed, receipts from 
remittances have grown significantly since 1997 (when no remittance receipts were 
recorded) to a peak of US$195 million in 2004. But in 2005 remittances’ growth was 
negative for the first time since 1997, allegedly due to the closure of illegal representative 
                                                                          
21 Remittances and proceeds from businesses contributed 30-40 percent of growth in deposits in 2005, 
according to data from BOM.   14
offices of Mongolian banks in South Korea. The sharp drop in Mongolia’s exports of 
textiles and apparel has had a modest net external effect because garments were 
manufactured mostly using imported inputs.
22  
Given the excess liquidity in the banking system in 2005, we conclude that it is not low 
domestic saving, but poor financial intermediation that has been primarily responsible for 
the high cost of capital in Mongolia. The Work Bank’s recent investment climate report 
(World Bank 2006b) provides compelling evidence that, with the possible exception of 
the wholesale and retail trade sector,
23 the degree of bank-based financial intermediation 
in business activity, even though improving is still very low in Mongolia.
24  
Domestic commercial bank deposit rates remain high in Mongolia compared to other 
emerging countries, in part due to intensive competition among financial institutions in 
recent years that has exerted an upward pressure on bank deposit rates, and in turn, on the 
commercial bank lending rates. In spite of ample liquidity in the banking system, 
banks—motivated, by the desire to expand their market shares—remain aggressive in 
attracting depositors by offering high deposit rates, and compressing their interest 
margins (Figure 5).
25 In fact, the average returns on commercial bank assets have 
declined from around 4 percent in 2002 to only 1.4 percent in 2005. In an attempt to 
consolidate the banking sector, the Bank of Mongolia stipulated an increase in the 
minimum paid-up capital requirement for commercial banks in Mongolia (from MNT 4 
billion to MNT 8 billion). This attempt seemed to have failed since the vast majority of 
existing banks (16 out of 17) met this new threshold quickly without having to close 
down or merge with other banks. 
The spreads between deposit and lending rates are also high compared to other countries 
(Figure 5). This is largely due to the difficulty banks have in assessing credit risk. In 
addition, the profitability of bank’s non-lending assets remains low since their operating 
costs and required reserve ratio are high by international standards. According to firm 
findings of the Mongolia’s Investment Climate Report (World Bank 2006b), the 
difficulty in assessing credit risk derives from a number of sources. The most important 
ones being poor corporate governance, and the lack of transparency in business 
operations, which makes it difficult for potential lenders to assess borrowers’ 
creditworthiness.  
The weakness of the bankruptcy and debt recovery framework in Mongolia translate into 
increased risks and costs of banking business. World Bank Investment Climate survey 
data show that bankruptcy claimants recover only 17 percent of total claims from 
insolvent firms in Mongolia, on average, compared to 24 percent for East Asia as a 
                                                                          
22 The lifting of quotas on exports of textiles and apparel from China in 2005 had a negative effect on 
Mongolia’s textile industry as many foreign-owned companies left Mongolia and relocated in China. 
23 The wholesale and retail sector was not covered by the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey 
(2004), which was the basis for the investment climate report. Also not covered by the survey are firms that 
failed and startups that did not make it. 
24 The degree of bank-based financial intermediation has increased in 2005 as the M2/GDP ratio rose to 52 
percent from 47 percent in 2004 and credit expanded at the highest pace since 1996. 
25 In 2005 the Central Bank reduced the coupon rate on its bonds and augmented liquidity in the banking 
system (World Bank 2006c).   15
group, and 73.8 percent for OECD countries. In response, banks in Mongolia have been 
forced to rely entirely on collateralized lending and to charge high risk premiums on their 
loans to small businesses and individuals.
26 Cheap financing is only made available to a 
few prime customers—typically big companies. For instance, whereas large firms can 
obtain financing for as little as 9.6 percent per year, the annual nominal cost of micro 
finance can be as high as 72 percent on short term loans to individuals or small firms 
(Table 7). 
Table 7:  Banks’ Lending Interest Rates (annual percentage rate on loans extended by banks in 
Mongolia) 
  2003-III 2004-III 2005-III 






Up to 1 year   41.5   11.0-72.0  39.0   6.0-72.0   42.0   12.0-72.0 
1 to 5 years   37.8   9.6-66.0   37.8   9.6-60.0   57.6   9.6-48.0  
5 and more years   33.3   7.8-58.8   17.8   12.0-23.5  17.8   12.0-23.5 
Industrial use   39.9   7.8-72.0   36.0   18.0-54.0  29.5   11.0-48.0 
Non-industrial use   40.8   9.6-72.0   24.0   6.0-42.0   27.0   6.0-48.0  
Source: Bank of Mongolia  
Access to capital in Mongolia has been limited for the majority of firms. Capital markets 
are underdeveloped and banks offer a limited range of products to firms
27 so bank loans 
are the primary instrument for raising capital from domestic sources.
28 Unlike firms in 
most of its neighboring countries, most Mongolian firms have relied largely on finance 
from informal sources for their investment and working capital needs. In 2004, only 6 
percent of new investment was financed by commercial bank loans, compared to the 
average for East Asia (17 percent). In the same year, less than a third of the firms in 
Mongolia had a commercial bank loan, and of those only 3 percent had loans with 
maturities of more than 5 years (Figure 6). Without such long-term credit, potential 
productivity-enhancing investments in plants, machinery, technology upgrading of 
processes are difficult to undertake on a sustained basis, thereby inhibiting a firm’s 
capabilities to scale up existing operations or improve product quality. 
The high collateral requirements have also resulted in limited access to credit. Collateral-
to-loan values are higher in Mongolia than in any other country in East and Central Asia. 
The ratio of collateral required to loan value is 224 percent in Mongolia compared to the 
average for East Asia (78 percent), and Europe and Central Asia (154 percent). 
Moreover, many people, especially in rural areas, do not have access to the collateral 
required by banks in the form of immovable assets (land or buildings) since the 
pastureland is not privately-owned (World Bank 2003). Land ownership in urban and 
                                                                          
26 According to the Doing Business database, the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws in 
Mongolia facilitate lending are comparable to those in East Asia and Central Asia. Mongolia scores higher 
than East Asia and Central Asia in terms of rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit 
information and the public credit registry coverage. 
27 Financing through leasing arrangements is practically non-existent in Mongolia. 
28 Mongolia’s financial system is dominated by commercial banks. The stock market is small and illiquid, 
insurance companies and pension funds are small, and a commercial bond market has yet to be developed 
(World Bank 1997).    16
peri-urban (“Ger”) areas is allowed in Mongolia in the form of long-term possession 
rights (up to 60 years with a possible one time extension of up to 40 years). However, 
transfer of possession rights is constrained by the need for permission from the relevant 
authorities. The rules and regulations for this are, however, not yet well established or 
published. This leads to lack of transparency in land allocation decisions in the urban and 
peri-urban (“Ger”) areas (Sommer 2003). 
Figure 6:  Firms’ access to credit in Mongolia 
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While the cost of capital is high and access to capital, especially long term financing, is 
limited, most of the firms that needed a loan got it. According to the 2004 Productivity 
and Investment Survey (PICS) 56 percent of Mongolian firms interviewed for the survey 
complained that the cost of capital was a severe obstacle to business growth, but only 22 
percent of the firms in the survey were discouraged and did not apply for a loan because 
of the high cost of capital (Figure 6).
29 Similarly, the survey results on access to capital 
suggest that while 42 percent of firms claimed that access to credit was a severe obstacle, 
70 percent of the firms either obtained a loan (28 percent of firms) or did not need a loan 
(42 percent of the firms) (Figure 6).  
Given the large number of firms that do not need to borrow at all, it follows that the high 
cost of capital is not the reason for the low private investment outside mining and 
construction. What are the reasons for this? To answer this question we turn to an 
assessment of returns to private investment in the non-mining related sectors in 
Mongolia.  
 
                                                                          
29 Of those that were discouraged the main reason they gave for not applying was the high cost of capital 
(82.8 percent or 22 percent of all survey respondents), but they also gave additional reasons which included 
stringent collateral requirements (72 percent),  cumbersome application procedures (59 percents), and 
perceived corruption in the allocation of credit (15 percent).    17
Table 8:  Selected Parameters on the Quality of the Business Environment, 2006 
   Min. capital 
to start a firm 
Recovery rate in the 







  (% of GNI 
per capita) 
(cents on the $)  Number  Days  (US$ per 
container) 
Mongolia 140.2  17.0  11 66  3007 
Cambodia  66.2 0.0  8 36  736 
Vietnam  0.0 18.0  6 35  701 
Azerbaijan  0.0 32.5  7 69  2275 
Kazakhstan  26.6 20.0  14 24  720 
Kyrgyz republic  0.6 19.8  .. ..  .. 
Uzbekistan  24.7 18.7  10 44  2550 
Ghana  23.2 24.7  5 21  822 
Uruguay  183.3 43.2  9 22  552 
East Asia & Pacific  109.2  24.0  6.9 23.9  885 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
49.1 29.8  7.4 29.2  1450 
L. America & 
Caribbean 
24.1 28.2  7.3 22.2  1068 
Middle East & N. 
Africa 
859.3 28.8  7.1 27.1  923 
OECD 41.0  73.8  4.8 10.5  811 
South Asia  0.8  19.7  8.1 34.4  1236 
Sub-Saharan Africa  297.2  16.1  8.2 40.0  1561 
Source: Doing Business Survey, World Bank (2006a) 
3.3 Are returns to private sector investment in non-mining-related activities low? 
One way to assess the rate of return to economic activity in Mongolia is to estimate total 
factor productivity growth (TFP) focusing on the period since transition.
 30,31 We assume 
that aggregate output can be expressed as a function of physical and human capital Y = 
AF(K,H), where Y is gross domestic product in constant 2000 purchasing power parity 
(PPP) prices; A is an index of total factor productivity; K is gross domestic capital stock 
in constant 2000 PPP prices; H is human-capital-adjusted labor input, defined as H = 
LDPe
(фS), where L is population; D is share of population age 15-64; P is labor force 
participation rate; S is number of years of education per worker; ф is a parameter that 
measures the returns to education. 
 
We consider two types of production functions. The first one is a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with possibly non-constant returns to scale F(K,H) = [K
α x H
(1 - α)] 
γ, 
                                                                          
30 PICS (2004) does not include data that allow direct estimation of rates of return to capital for individual 
firms. 
31 Notice that TFP growth is difficult to estimate. Small differences in assumptions can lead to very 
different estimate of TFP growth and growth in TFP reflect factors other than pure technical change such as 
increasing returns to scale, markups due to imperfect competition, and sectoral reallocations. The growth 
accounting method for estimating TFP growth is discussed in Ghosh and Kraay (2000). The method relies 
on data from the Government of Mongolia, the World Bank and IMF.   18
where α is a parameter between 0 and 1 that measures the relative importance of capital, 
and γ is a parameter that measures the extent of returns to scale. Reasonable values of α 
range from 0.3 to 0.5. If γ=1 (γ > 1) (γ < 1) there are constant (increasing) (decreasing) 
returns to scale. Reasonable values of γ range from 0.8 to 1.2. The second one is a 
constant-returns-to-scale constant elasticity of substitution production function: F (K, H) 
= [αK
ρ + (1 - α)H 
(1 - ρ)] 
(1/ρ) where ρ = (σ-1)/σ is the elasticity of substitution between K 
and H. When σ = 1 this reduces to the Cobb-Douglas case above with γ= 1. Reasonable 
values of σ range from 0.8 to 1.2.   
 
To estimate the level and growth rate of A, we require data on Y, K, L, D, P, and S. These 
are drawn from the following sources. Real GDP and gross domestic investment in 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars adjusted for differences in PPP come from World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. Data on population, the share of population aged 15-64, 
and the labor force participation rate are computed based on data from the World Bank’s 
SIMA. We assume that the labor force participation rate is an average of the labor force 
participation rates for females and males. Data on the stock of years of education in 1989 
and 1998 are obtained from Mongolia’s Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), 
1998. Numbers for the other years were estimated assuming a constant annual growth 
rate in the human capital stock. The parameter ф, which measures the returns to 
education (i.e. the percentage increase in worker productivity due to an additional year of 
education) is assumed to be 10 percent.   
 
Capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory method which requires 
information on the initial capital-output ratio in 1992, depreciation rates (δ), and gross 
domestic investment in constant U.S. dollars adjusted for differences in PPP (I).  For 
most developing countries, reasonable values for the initial capital-output ratio range 
between 1 and 2, and for the depreciation rate are between 0.04 and 0.08. Following 
Ghosh and Kraay (2000) we use initial capital-output ratio of 1 and δ = 0.06 in all 
calculations.  
 
This analysis suggests that TFP growth has improved in recent years, and in 2004 
productivity rose by nearly 5 percent (Figure 7). The result that productivity growth was 
positive in 2004 holds under all plausible sensitivity scenarios (Table 9).  
 
Another way to measure the productivity of capital or the rate of return to capital (r) is to 
compare the rate of real per capita GDP growth (g) and the investment share in GDP (SI) 
as in  I S g r / = . A cross-country regression of real per capita growth on investment 
shares in a sample of countries in Favaro (2005) suggests that countries with higher 
investment shares tend to grow at higher per capita growth rates. According to this 
estimation, Mongolia’s real per capita annual growth rate, which averaged 2.6 percent in 
the period 1996-2004, was much higher than the one suggested by the average of 2 
percent for the countries in the sample.
32 In 2004, Mongolia’s rate of return to capital 
accelerated much above the average as real per capita growth climbed above 9.3 percent, 
while its investment share stayed close to 36 percent. 
 
                                                                          
32 Mongolia’s average investment share for the period 1996-2004 was 34.4 percent.   19
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Output growth TFP growth Factor growth Linear (TFP growth)  
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the following assumptions: Cobb-Douglas production function with 
CRTS (γ=1) and capital share α=0.5. 
 
Table 9. Sensitivity analysis of TFP growth in 2004 
TFP growth estimates in 2004 (%) 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
  α=0.3  α=0.4  α=0.5 
Γ=1 (CRTS)  5.8  5.2  4.5 
Γ=1.2 (IRTS)  5.0  4.2  3.4 
γ=0.8 (DRTS)  6.7  6.2  5.7 
TFP growth estimates in 2004 (%) 
(CRTS CES) 
  σ=0.8  σ=1  σ=1.2 
α=0.5 7.1  4.5  2.6 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
Note: Growth rates are in log form. 
 
Although the aggregate indicators suggest that Mongolia used capital efficiently, not all 
sectors enjoyed high returns to capital. Over the past two years, a number of sectors 
seemed to lag behind the better performing ones in the past 2 years, and in two sectors—
manufacturing and transport—the returns to capital were not only low, they were 
negative (Table 10). Mongolia’s structure of production has evolved in a way that has 
increased its dependence on ores and metals (Table 11).
33 The share of primary 
commodities in total merchandise exports grew from 67 percent in 1992 to 87 percent in 
2005, while the share of manufactured exports dropped from 33 percent to 13 percent 
(Table 12). At the same time the non-metal manufacturing base has narrowed 




                                                                          
33 The mining share in total value added underestimates the contribution of the sector as it does not reflect 
the output of the artisinal mining sector.   20
Table 10. Industries’ Contribution to Real Growth in Mongolia (in percentage points) 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Agriculture  1.2 1.6 2.5 1.7  -6.2  -6.2  -3.5 1.1 4.1 1.9 
Industry  -1.7  -0.9 0.9 0.0  -0.2 3.7 0.4 1.6 4.0  -0.1 
    Manufacturing  -2.4 -1.4  0.3 -0.5 -0.4  2.2  1.2  0.7 -0.1 -2.2 
    Mining  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.2  -1.2  -0.3 4.1 1.7 
    Construction  0.1  -0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.4 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.4 
Services  1.6 3.2  -0.1  -0.1 3.4 1.5 6.0 3.1 1.5 4.3 
    Utilities  -0.8  -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 
    Transport  0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8  -0.3 
      Trade  0.3 3.2  -1.2  -1.6 1.3 0.1 2.7 1.4  -0.7 4.3 
    Other  services  1.6 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.7  -0.3 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Source: Staff estimates based on data from World Bank (LDB). 
 
Table 11. Industry Composition of Total Value-added in Mongolia (at constant producer 
prices) 
Shares  in:  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005 
Agriculture  36.4 36.6 37.8 38.8 33.6 27.7 23.6 23.4  25.1 25.5 
Industry  22.1 20.4 20.6 20.3 20.8 24.7 24.3 24.5  26.1 24.4 
    Manufacturing  7.8 6.1 6.3 5.6 5.4 7.7 8.6 8.8  8.0 5.4 
    Mining  11.5 11.7 11.9 12.2 13.2 14.5 12.9 11.9  14.6 15.3 
    Construction  2.8 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.8  3.5 3.6 
Services  41.5 43.1 41.6 40.9 45.6 47.6 52.1 52.1  48.9 50.1 
    Utilities  2.8 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.2  3.1 2.9 
  Transport  8.2  7.8  8.1  8.0  9.5  11.0  12.6  13.4  13.9  12.8 
   Trade  12.9  15.5  13.8  12.1  13.7 13.9 16.1 16.6  14.4 17.7 
    Other  services  17.7 17.1 17.0 18.1 19.4 19.3 19.8 18.9  17.5 16.7 
Source: World Bank, LDB 
Note: Agriculture is dominated by livestock herding. 
 
These trends reflect favorable commodity prices and declining prices of manufactured 
goods, and suggest that Mongolia has grown successfully by increasing its specialization 
in products in which it has a comparative advantage.
34 But as a result: (i) Mongolia’s 
economy has become more vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks, natural disasters and 
environmental degradation; (ii) Mongolian manufacturing firms are now less 
internationally competitive, and (iii) Mongolia uses its scare resource—labor
35—rather 
inefficiently. Indeed, Mongolia’s share in world manufactured exports has declined, and 
except in mining,
36 its value added per worker is rather low (Figure 8), primarily since 
agriculture employs 40 percent of the country’s labor force, while it contributes only 25 
percent of the total value added. Not surprisingly, the highly capital-intensive mining 
sector posts significantly higher value-added per worker. Some may also consider these 
symptoms to characterize a “Dutch Disease” phenomenon.  
                                                                          
34 Mongolia’s vast mineral wealth includes over 6000 known mineral deposits of 80 different minerals and 
Mongolia’s mining sector is viewed as the engine of growth. 
35 Mongolia is one of the largest landlocked countries in the world with a population of just 2.5 million. 
36 Labor productivity in the mining sector would be considerably lower if we include the output of artisanal 
miners.   21
 
Table 12. Composition of Mongolia’s merchandise exports 
  ‘92  ‘93 ‘94 ‘95  ‘96  ‘97 ‘98  ‘99 ‘00  ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 
Primary goods  67  73 83 89  84  83 82  76 72  62 61 63 86 87 
  Cooper  45  42 51 53  41  35 27  26 30  28 26 26 33 31 
  Gold  9  6  3 11  12  21 25  21 13  14 22 25 28 31 
  Cashmere  3  3 7 9  12  6 7 10  10  11 6 4 5 5 
  Flour spar  3  2 3 4  5  4 4  4 4  4 3 3 2 2 
  Other primary  7  20 18 12  14  18 19  15 15  5  5  5 18 18 
Manufactures  33  27 17 11  16  17 18  24 28  38 39 37 14 13 
Source: World Bank (LDB) 

































Source: Authors’ estimates based on data from Mongolian Statistical Yearbook (2004) and Government of 
Mongolia. 
3.3.1 Is poor infrastructure a binding constraint to growth? 
In 2005, delays in obtaining basic service connections were still longer and service 
reliability was still lower in Mongolia than in other East Asian countries. However, 
public dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of transport services seems more widespread. 
Among the firms surveyed as part of the Productivity and Investment Climate Survey 
(2004), nearly forty percent of firms
38 mentioned transport bottlenecks as a major 
business impediment in Mongolia. Meanwhile, less than a quarter of the firms viewed the 
reliability of and access to electricity services as a major obstacle, and even fewer, 
viewed water and telecommunication services to be an issue.
39 
                                                                          
37 Economy-wide labor productivity growth estimated, as the value added at constant prices per worker, 
stagnated over the past ten years. Labor productivity in agriculture, which employs a sizable share of 
Mongolia’s working age population, was lower than other sectors’ labor productivity, and declined 
substantially after 2000, while in services labor productivity was only slightly higher than the average.  
38 Even though only 38 percent of firms surveyed as part of the Productivity and Investment Climate 
Survey (2004) perceived transportation to be the most severe constraint to growth, the share underestimates 
the severity of transportation services as an obstacle to trade and export growth since the sample includes 
both exporters and domestic-oriented firms (i.e. firms that do not trade). 
39 The results on telecommunications are encouraging as this sector creates conditions for birth and growth 
of new information technology firms that are vital for productivity growth. A cross-country comparison 
based on data from World Bank’s SIMA suggests that just like in China most of the main lines are in urban   22
 
Low level of capacity utilization in Mongolian firms implies that service interruptions 
due to inadequacies in the provision of infrastructure services did not result in large 
production losses.
40 While in East Asia each day of electrical outage results in a 
production decline equivalent to 0.75 percent of sales, in Mongolia the loss from each 




Transportation services for freight movement however are limited, costly and unreliable, 
and are binding constraint to export growth. The majority of goods are moved by rail and 
rail transport costs are much higher than those in other landlocked countries in Central 
Asia (Table 13).
42 For example, while for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Republic 
the transport costs per kilometer to transport a twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) 
container to the nearest port ($/km/TEU) are around $0.37, Mongolia’s are $0.61 – 
comparable to the costs faced by Tajikistan whose infrastructure was severely damaged 
by the civil war in the mid-nineties (1992-1997). The border crossing costs in terms of 
$/TEU and hours spent at the border are also much higher for Mongolia than those for 
landlocked countries in East Asia (e.g. Lao) and South Asia (e.g. Nepal). These costs 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
areas, but the number of main lines per capita is lower than that in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, and 
much lower than the one in China. Telephone services have become more reliable over the past 10 years, 
and the number of people on a waiting list for mainlines has steadily declined over the past few years. 
Business telephone connection charges are comparable to those in the U.S. and have declined steadily over 
the past 5 years. 
40 Capacity utilization is broadly measured as the ratio of actual output to what could be potentially 
produced given existing human and physical resources. While capacity utilization has risen in the last three 
years, it is still low at just over 71 percent. 
41 The loss from each day of water supply failure in Mongolia is 0.075 percent of sales, compared to 1.3 
percent of sales in East Asia (World Bank 2006b). 
42 Landlocked countries typically face much bigger constraints to trade with the outside world than coastal 
countries.  
43 The majority of Mongolian transit traffic is carried by rail through one rail link to the nearest port of 
Tianjin. Because this rail operates at the wide-gauge used in Russia, rather than the standard gauge used in 
China, at the border either the axles on the wagons need to be changed or containers have to be transferred 
from one wagon to another. This operation makes up 25 percent of the overall transport cost to port.   23
Table 13. Rail transport costs 
  Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Kyrgyz 
Rep. 
Mongolia 
 Almaty Tashkent Dushanbe Bishkek Ulaan  Baator 
 Trade  Trade  Trade  Trade  Exports  Imports 
Distance to nearest port* (km)  3380  2720  2040  3100  1700  1700 
Cost ($/TEU/km)  0.37  0.35  0.59  0.34  0.61  0.87 
Source: staff estimates based on data for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic from 
Chapter 5 in Broadman (2005) and data on Mongolia from World Bank (2006b).  
*Karachi for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic; Tianjin for Mongolia. 
 
Although it is possible to transport goods from China to the border with Mongolia by 
road and then to the capital city by rail, the transfer extends the time and adds to the total 
transport cost. In fact, it costs more to transport goods from China to Mongolia by road-
rail, then only by rail. While air transport accounted for only 0.02 percent of all freight 
movement in 2000, and has been used to transport mostly livestock-based products, 
international air services have been a binding constraint to growth of Mongolia’s tourism 
industry as they are unreliable and lack peak period capacity. During the short summer 
months, when most tourists would like to visit the country, there are one or two daily 
services from a few destinations and tour operators indicate short supply of seats and 
unreliable advance reservation system (World Bank 2006b). 
 
In Mongolia transport costs for imports are much higher than transport cost for exports. 
The transport costs from the port of Tianjin to Ulan Bator, for instance, are 42 percent 
higher than the already high transport costs for exports (Table 13).
44 In addition, transit 
times by rail are long and uncertain
45 as a result of complex transit procedures, including 
customs and trade rules. Whereas the border crossing time for the other landlocked 
countries in East Asia is under 6 hours on average, with a maximum of 25 hours, the 
border crossing time for Mongolia is 25 hours on average, with the maximum extending 
to 75 hours.
46 The uncertainty about the hours spent at the border implies that exporters 
find it difficult to meet the delivery requirements of overseas buyers or must incur 
additional storage costs if they deliver the goods early.  
 
High trade costs due to costly and unreliable transportation services, lengthy and complex 
transit procedures, including customs and trade rules (Table 18), impede access of 
Mongolian firms to foreign markets and potentially cost Mongolian firms market 
opportunities. Access to foreign markets is critical to a small, open economy like 
Mongolia because it allows domestic producers to realize economies of scale and take 
part in global production sharing. Moreover, the high cost of transport services will prove 
to be a much bigger problem for Mongolia’s economy in an environment of weak prices 
                                                                          
44 Since the export volume is only 10 percent of the import volume transported in containers along the Ulan 
Bator-Tianjin corridor, this imbalance raises the transport cost for imports because a fee for an empty 
container adds to the transport cost $436 per TEU by rail-rail and $514 per TEU by road-rail. 
45 Source: Mongolia’s Ministry of Infrastructure (2002). 
46 Source: Application of UNESCAP Time/Cost-Distance Model and Route Analysis, presentation by 
Geetha Karandawala, Chief, Transport Facilitation Section, Transport and Tourism Division, UNESCAP at 
the National Workshop and Advisory Services on Trade and Transport Facilitation Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 
17-19 April 2006. See also Table 18.   24
for copper and gold, when previously profitable operations may become non-viable, 
thereby potentially leading to a severe drop in economic activity and trade volumes. 
Finally, high trade costs impede the process of economic diversification in Mongolia – an 
issue that we turn to next. 
 
3.3.2 Do Mongolian Firms Innovate?  
According to Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) diversification of the productive structure 
requires “discovery” of an economy’s cost structure. Firms must experiment with new 
product lines, adapt new technologies from abroad to local conditions, and “discover” 
which products they can produce at low enough cost to be profitable and competitive. 
Mongolia is the 37
th least diversified economy among a group of 100 developing 
countries. Mongolia is less diversified than its comparators, which include other land-
locked, resource-rich countries, except Cambodia (Figure 9).  
 
Since 1990 Mongolia’s dependence on primary goods has grown and the top five exports 
in terms of value have claimed an ever increasing share of exports, which in 2004 was 90 
percent (Figure 10). The manufacturing base is very narrow and in 2005 comprised of 
three product groups – metals, which accounted for 61 percent of manufactured exports, 
textiles (18 percent), and apparel (13 percent). All remaining products – including metal 
products - add up to just 8 percent of exports.
47  
 
Even though Mongolia’s manufacturing base is narrow, it is not because firms do not 
attempt to diversify into and export new products. As a way to assess the level of 
entrepreneurial effort or “self discovery” in Mongolia, we looked at the composition of 
newly exported goods in recent years. When measured at the 4 digit level of the 
Harmonized System the number of exported products has grown from 351 in 2002 to 462 
in 2005 – an increase of 32 percent. The increase could have been much higher had 
Mongolian firms managed to lower the number of discontinued exports and had they not 
failed to continue exporting the majority of their new export lines. According to UN 
COMTRADE database every year during the period 2002-06 Mongolia exported on 
average 135 new product lines, but discontinued 98 products, of which 62 percent were 
new exports (Table 14).   
 
While manufactured goods represented a large share of new exports, they also 
represented a large share of new exports that were discontinued the following year. In 
2003 and 2004 this share was 83 percent and 72 percent, respectively. This suggests that 
some Mongolian firms attempted to “innovate”, but failed to market these products 
abroad and maintain these export volumes. Table 15 displays the lists of discontinued 
new manufactured products in 2004 and 2005. The process of “self-discovery” has been 
hampered by high trade costs and a variety of negative coordination externalities 
discussed next.
48 
                                                                          
47 See also UNIDO (2002) – a report on Mongolia’s manufacturing sector. 
48 Although economic diversification of a resource based economy poses many challenges, successes in a 
number of countries (such as Australia, Chile and Finland) show that it is possible to use natural resources 
to diversify within the natural resource sector, as well as move into new sectors. It is also possible not only 
to use mineral wealth to diversify within and out of mining, but to start exporting mineral know-how.   25
 




















Herfindahl Index Hirschman Index
 
Source: Database on export diversification (PRMED). 
Note: The higher the Herfindahl and Hirshman indices, the lower the degree of diversification. 
 

















































Herfindahl Index Export share of five largest exports
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
3.3.3 Are coordination failures a binding constraint to private sector growth? 
Effective coordination with domestic and international partners is necessary in order to 
create a climate for firm “innovation” on a sustained basis which involves coordination 
when designing and implementing laws and regulations, economic policies, sector, 
resource use and trade strategies. Characteristic for a climate conducive to “innovation” 
are services that are taken for granted by entrepreneurs in developed countries. These 
include access to logistics transport networks and other types of infrastructure, marketing,   26
research and product quality information, health and quarantine measures to protect and 
improve the quality of the agricultural and livestock sector output. In a global economy 
entrepreneurs need to also access information on international industry standards, and 
applicable international trade agreements in order to compete in world markets and 
understand the implications of these agreements for their operations.  
 
Table 14. Indicators of innovation in Mongolia 
Number of:  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Exported goods  351  393  436  462 
New exports    120  145  139 
New manufactured exports    99  104   
Discontinued exports    78  102  113 
New exports discontinued next year  63  71   
New manufactured exports discontinued next year  51  51   
Source: Authors’ estimates based on UN COMTRADE data, HS 4 digits. 
 
In developing countries poor quality or lack of such services is a serious obstacle to 
output expansion of existing products, improving the quality of existing goods, and new 
product development (“self-discovery”). In Mongolia poor transport logistics and limited 
understanding among firms of how to comply with international quality and 
environmental standards, poor ability to market products in domestic and foreign markets 
stem from coordination failures.
49 We use a few specific examples of coordination 
failures in Mongolia to clarify these points. 
  
In Mongolia, the cashmere textile industry offers an example of coordination failures that 
have stunted its growth in recent years (World Bank 2003). The industry is an 
oligopsony, (in which a few processors of cashmere have monopsonistic power over a 
large number of herders supplying raw cashmere). Herders operate in remote areas, lack 
information, and are often forced to sell their cashmere either to traders at the farm gate 
or at informal provincial markets at 10 to 45 percent discounts from the prices in the main 
market in Ulaanbaatar. Herders realize that poor quality raw cashmere is a problem and 
are reluctant to allow buyers to separate their raw cashmere into different grades. They 
fear that they may not be able to sell the rejected cashmere, and therefore prefer to sell it 
in one lot. Buyers have responded by buying unsorted raw cashmere at lower prices in 
order to hedge the risk of poor quality.  
                                                                          
49 For instance, the main obstacle to expanding meat exports to Russia is primarily the current ban on such 
imports from Mongolia that was put in place after the outbreak of “foot-and-mouth” disease in 2001.   27
Table 15. New manufactured exports discontinued in 2004 and 2005 
HS No.  2004  HS No.  2005 
3208  Paints and varnishes     3214    Glaziers' putty, grafting putty 
3306  Preparations for oral or dental hygiene    3302    Mixtures of odoriferous substances  
3402  Organic surface-active agents     3305    Preparations for use on the hair 
3405  Polishes and creams, for footwear     3502    Albumins  
3603  Safety fuses; detonating fuses    3916    Monofilament  
3813  Preparations and charges for fire-e    3919    Self-adhesive plates, sheets, film 
4008  Plates, sheets, strip, rods and pro    3921    Other plates, sheets, film, foil 
4410  Particle board and similar board     4005    Compounded rubber 
4411  Fibreboard of wood or other     4404    Hoopwood; split poles; piles 
4503  Articles of natural cork.    4601    Plaits and similar products 
4602  Basketwork, wickerwork and other     4904    Music, printed or in manuscript 
4818  Toilet paper and similar paper     4909    Printed or illustrated postcards 
5110  Yarn of coarse animal hair     4910    Calendars of any kind, printed 
5804  Tulles and other net fabrics    5113    Woven fabrics of coarse animal hair 
5911  Textile products and articles     5509    Yarn (other than sewing thread) 
6005  Warp knit fabrics      5601    Wadding of textile materials 
6006  Other knitted or crocheted fabrics.    5801    Woven pile fabrics and chenille fabrics 
6303  Curtains (including drapes)    5805    Hand-woven tapestries of the type 
6401 Waterproof  footwear with outer sole    5808    Braids in the piece 
6804  Millstones, grindstones, grinding w    5905    Textile wall coverings 
6805  Natural or artificial abrasive powder    6112    Track suits, ski suits and swimwear 
6813  Friction material and articles     6213    Handkerchiefs 
6901  Bricks, blocks, tiles and other    6402    Other footwear with outer soles 
6910  Ceramic sinks, wash basins   6507    Head-bands, linings, covers, hats 
7004  Drawn glass and blown glass    6601    Umbrellas and sun umbrellas  
7315  Chain and parts thereof, of iron     7001    Cullet and other waste and scrap 
7317  Nails, tacks, drawing pins,     7010    Carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pot 
7325  Other cast articles of iron or steel    7116    Articles of natural or cultured pearls 
7405  Master alloys of copper.    7213    Bars and rods, hot-rolled 
7503  Nickel waste and scrap.    7314    Cloth (including endless bands) 
8112  Beryllium, chromium, germanium, van  7508    Other articles of nickel. 
8207  Interchangeable tools for hand tool    8305    Fittings for loose-leaf binders 
8208  Knives and cutting blades, for machines    8417    Industrial or laboratory furnaces 
8434  Milking machines and dairy machinery    8437    Machines for cleaning, sorting  
8442  Machinery, apparatus and equipment   8438    Machinery 
8445  Machines for preparing textile fibres    8461    Machine-tools for planing, shaping 
8459  Machine-tools     8503    Parts suitable for use solely or pr 
8504  Electrical transformers, static con    8510    Shavers, hair clippers  
8532  Electrical capacitors, fixed, variable    8518    Microphones and stands  
8537  Boards, panels, consoles, desks, ca    8523    Prepared unrecorded media for sound 
8540  Thermionic, cold cathode or photo-cathode    8527    Reception apparatus for radio-telephone 
8705  Special purpose motor vehicles    8535    Electrical apparatus for switching  
8801  Balloons and dirigibles; gliders    8543    Electrical machines and apparatus  
8901  Cruise ships, excursion boats    9023    Instruments, apparatus and models  
9001  Optical fibres and optical fibre     9029    Revolution counters 
9006  Photographic     9104    Instrument panel clocks and clocks  
9208  Musical boxes, fairground organs    9110    Complete watch or clock movements  
9307  Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances    9205    Other wind musical instruments  
9601  Worked ivory, bone, tortoise-shell,    9303    Other firearms and similar devices  
9609  Pencils    9611    Date, sealing or numbering stamps  
9618  Tailors' dummies and other lay figures    9614    Smoking pipes 
 Source: UN COMTRADE data.   28
Herders have lacked access to finance, information and infrastructure in order to improve 
the quality of their cashmere. Processors could have helped herders to improve the 
quality of raw cashmere but have been reluctant to enter into direct marketing or vertical 
relationships with them because of lack of transparent and enforceable contracting rules, 
and the difficulty to police such arrangements due to the small size of herds per 
household and the long term nature of the investment.  
 
The problem has been compounded by lack of market information available to herders, 
and the fact that processors have had no incentive to form strategic links with 
downstream agents and to improve their productivity
50 as government policies generally 
favor them. The export tax on raw cashmere has provided incentives to processors to 
offer the same price regardless of quality. Herders have responded by smuggling 
cashmere to China, selling quality raw cashmere to Chinese buyers, depriving domestic 
processing firms of high quality raw material, and forcing them to operate below 
capacity. High labor costs, unreliable energy supply, lack of technical skills, non-tax 
administrative barriers, and high transport costs have added to the problems of 
Mongolian cashmere processing firms.
51  
 
Another example of a coordination failure is the government’s inability to regulate the 
use of critical inputs such as land and water which have led to overgrazing, near 
saturation of land-use capacity, and soil erosion in Mongolia. Lack of regulation of water 
well use and poor public sector maintenance have decreased agricultural productivity and 
have left herders searching long distances for water facilities. The combination of these 
failures and the lack of risk management have worsened the impact of bad weather on the 
farm sector. Since sustainability considerations preclude further growth in the size of 




There remains the need to coordinate the development of an international rail/road 
network to facilitate transit, international, and domestic trade, and air transport to 
facilitate tourism and international trade. Mongolia’s poor transport network is a severe 
constraint to most activities in Mongolia including. Custom facilitation and transit 
procedures also need to be improved, as well as marketing, export promotion and product 
quality information, which is critical to the success of companies but somewhat scarce in 
Mongolia.
53 Many medium and small companies and companies operating in the informal 
                                                                          
50 Labor productivity in Mongolia’s cashmere processing companies is much lower than that in other 
countries (USAID, 2006) 
51 A study by USAID (2006) found that overall the manufacturing quality of cashmere apparel makers is 
good.  
52 With the outbreak of the Hoof and Mouth Disease in Mongolia in 2001 China and Russia banned exports 
of all animal products causing substantial losses in income of herders and processors and a dramatic decline 
in exports of meat products. Surveillance, diagnosis and mitigation (including vaccination programs) need 
to be strengthened in Mongolia, as well as access to information on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards in 
other countries. 
53 According to Otsuka (2006) information about and access to markets, and access to specialized skills 
needed to improve product quality are critical to multi-faceted innovation, while access to credit matters 
only after multi-faceted innovation has taken place. His findings are based on research in a number of 
countries including China, Taiwan, Vietnam and Africa.   29
sector do not have funds to license new technologies or to send their employees to 
foreign markets for training. Lack of marketing skills and information is one reason why 
Mongolian firms miss opportunities to expand in foreign markets. For example, they have 
not been able to take advantage of the duty free access to the EU for 7200 products.  
 
High protection in China and Russia on a number of key Mongolian exports has also 
been cited as an obstacle to export growth. Indeed, in 2003 a number of leather, wool and 
meat products faced tariffs above 30 percent in Russia (Table 16). Since then protection 
has declined in Russia, and remains high mostly on meat and meat related products 
(Table 16). Currently, the main obstacle to expanding meat exports is not the tariff, but 
the ban on imports from Mongolia related to the Hoof and Mouth disease and the SPS 
requirements in foreign markets. Diversification and deepening of supply chains within 
Mongolia’s mining sector is also extremely important given the country’s vast mineral 
wealth and high transport costs.  
 
3.3.4 Is the tax code a binding constraint to private sector growth?  
Our analysis finds that distortionary taxes, including lately in the mining sector, and 
complex customs and trade rules have increased the implicit cost of doing business in 
Mongolia. A major overhaul of the tax code which took effect in January 2007 is 
expected to relax this constraint somewhat, but problems related to tax administration 
that go hand in hand with tax burden issues (Figure 11) are outstanding.
54  
  
The tax base in Mongolia has been very narrow. The top 100 taxpayers provided over 90 
percent of the revenues and nearly half of the firms reported zero or negative profit in 
2004. Tax evasion is rampant as well, even after the recent reduction of the windfall tax 
liability from the raising of the “trigger price” on gold. Tax administration remains weak. 
There is substantial variation in the effective tax rates implicit in the taxes paid by 
different firms within a net income range suggesting inconsistencies in tax administration 
(Figure 12). The primary cause for these inconsistencies is the excessive discretion 
enjoyed by inspectors and their rent-seeking behavior.
55 The average number of days 
spent meeting with tax inspectors was considerably higher than in most other countries in 
East and Central Asia (Table 17). Tax officers were perceived as corrupt by 95 percent of 
those interviewed in a 2004 survey by Partnership for Transparency.  
 
Mongolia uses also duty exemptions on exports in order to stimulate processing and 
assembly. However, duty exemptions are likely to do more harm than good to 
Mongolia’s small open economy
56 because trade tariffs are already low and uniform (at 5 
percent), tax administration is weak and exemptions are granted not only to imported  
 
 
                                                                          
54 In June 2006 the government proposed a major overhaul of the tax structure including a unified 15 
percent corporate income tax rate, a reduction in the VAT rate from 15 percent to 10 percent, and a 
reduction in the personal income tax rate to 10 percent.  
55 Source: 2004 survey by Partnership for Transparency. 
56 Mongolia can be considered a price taker both for inputs and outputs of most products (UNCTAD/WTO 
2006).   30
Table 16. List of selected product lines facing tariffs above 30 percent in Russia  
Code  
6 digits 
Product Description  MFN Tariff  
Rate 
2003     
020120  Meat of bovine animals: other cuts, fresh or chilled, with bone in  30 
020210  Meat of bovine animals: carcasses and half-carcasses, frozen  30 
220860 Vodka  30 
020220  Meat of bovine animals: other cuts, frozen, with bone in  31 
650692  Other :-- Of fur skin  31 
020230  Meat of bovine animals: boneless, frozen  32 
020726  Meat and edible cuts and offal of turkeys, fresh or chilled  32 
611710  Shawls, scarves, mufflers, mantillas, veils and the like  32 
020130  Meat of bovine animals: boneless, fresh or chilled  33 
160250  Other prepared or preserved meat, meal offal or blood of bovine animals  33 
640320  Footwear with outer soles of leather, & uppers consisting of leather straps  34 
630190  Other blankets and traveling rugs  37 
640420  Footwear with outer soles of leather or composition leather  37 
160100  Sausages and similar products of meat, meat offal or blood    37 
020110  Meat of bovine animals: carcasses and half-carcasses, fresh or chilled  38 
420310  Articles of apparel, of leather or of composition of leather  38 
640510  With uppers of leather or composition leather  41 
620510  Ensembles: Of wool or fine animal hair  50 
020621  Of bovine animals, frozen – tongues     50 
420321  Gloves, mittens and mitts, especially designed for use in sports  82 
640590  Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition 
leather 
82 
621131  Other men's or boys' garments of wool or fine animal hair  105 
2005     
640320  Footwear with outer soles of leather, and uppers consisting of leather straps  30 
160220  Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood: of liver of any 
animal 
30 
611110  Babies’ garments and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted – of wool 
or fine animal hair 
33 
020230 Boneless  cuts  36 
160100  Sausages and similar products of meat, meat offal or blood  37 
160249  Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood  38 
020220  Other cuts with bone in   38 
420329  Gloves, mittens and mitts - Other  56 
020321  Frozen – Carcasses and half-carcasses  58 
020621  Of bovine animals, frozen - Tongues  70 
Source: Tarr, Shepotylo, and Koudoyarov (2005). See Tarr et al. (2005) for a complete list of products 
facing tariffs above 30 percent.  
 
inputs but to all sorts of product lines.
57,58 They also disadvantage domestic SMEs as 
small companies lack the expertise, incentives and political connections to go through the 
                                                                          
57 While 31.5 percent of imports were duty exempt, only 10 percent of imports were duty-exempt imports 
used for the production of exports in 2004 (World Bank 2006b).  
58 Studies have shown that duty exemptions are more likely to have a positive welfare effect if the economy 
is small with high input tariffs, low administrative costs, and uncorrupt tax authorities (Ianchovichina, 
2007).   31
bureaucratic processes of obtaining duty exemption. Finally, an export tax on 
unprocessed cashmere, intended to encourage production and export of processed 
cashmere products, has resulted instead in an increase of smuggled cashmere into China, 
and not to the intended boost in processed cashmere output.
59  
 




















0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0




































































Source: World Bank (2006b). 
 
Table 17. Average no. of days spent a year meeting with tax inspectors 
Mongolia  9.0  Europe & Central Asia  2.8 
East Asia & Pacific  5.4  Azerbaijan   1.3 
Cambodia 7.2  Kazakhstan    3.2 
China  12.0  Kyrgyz Republic   3.2 
Malaysia   3.8  Russian Federation   2.5 
 
Source: World Bank (2006b). 
3.3.5 Is corruption a binding constraint to private sector growth?  
According to more than half of the firms that participated in the most recent Productivity 
and Investment Climate survey (2004) corruption is the number one obstacle to growth 
and pervades every sphere of business activity. Firms paying bribes to obtain access to 
electricity, water, and communication infrastructure are respectively 26 percent, 15 
percent and 23 percent of all firms surveyed. A quarter of these firms pay bribes for 
customs clearances of traded goods as the number of documents and steps required for 
trading across borders as well as the time spent on clearance procedures is much higher in 
Mongolia than in other countries in the world (Table 18). Unofficial payments, required 
for obtaining licenses, and the average bribe for different types of licenses were high – 
around 40 percent of the official fees according to World Bank (2006b).  
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Source: World Bank (2006b). 
 
Corruption in Mongolia has worsened since 2001, according to Transparency 
International and the World Bank’s Governance Indicator, and perceptions of corruption 
as an obstacle to growth are more widespread in Mongolia than in a number of 
comparator countries. Mongolia ranks 9
th out of 62 countries, for which firm level survey 
data were available, in terms of its share of firms reporting corruption as a major obstacle 
to their growth (World Bank 2006b). Mongolia’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) score on transparency, accountability and corruption of the public 
sector is much lower than that of most countries in East Asia.
60 But Mongolia’s rank on 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is 3, slightly better than that 
of Fitch’s ‘B’ median of 2.9. 
 
Corruption appears to be a major impediment to large, successful firms in Mongolia, 
especially those based in the capital city (World Bank 2006b). The process of obtaining 
permits is nontransparent and many companies have to employ expensive mediators 
whose job is to negotiate the process of obtaining a permit. Inspectors, most commonly 
from the Tax Offices of the Government and the State Professional Inspection Agency, 
visited firms frequently. According to calculations in World Bank (2006b) the total cost 
of fines, fees and unofficial payments made up over half of the direct financial costs 
incurred by firms. 
 
More than half of the firms surveyed by the World Bank as part of the 2006 Investment 
Climate Assessment said that they are expected to make an unofficial payment to 
government officials, which on average is over 4 percent of the value of a government 
contract. This average payment is higher than in most of the countries for which such 
data exist (World Bank 2006b). An even larger share of firms surveyed (64 percent) are 
concerned with the openness and fairness of the bidding process. There is little 
understanding of conflict of interest issues, and although the Law on Civil Service asks 
for income and asset declaration by public officials, the law has not been enforced. In 
addition, the perception of nearly half of the firms surveyed is that individuals with 
                                                                          
60 Only Tonga and Lao, PDR have scored lower than Mongolia on this dimension of the CPIA ratings.    33
political ties have a major or decisive influence on the formulation of laws and 
regulations governing the business climate (World Bank 2006b).  
 
Table 18. Selected parameters of the business environment 
















 number  days  (US$  per 
container) 
number %  of  debt Days 
Mongolia  11 66  3007  29 17.6  314 
Cambodia  8 36  736 31 121  401 
Vietnam  6 35  701  37  31.0  295 
Azerbaijan  7 69  2275  27  19.8  267 
Kazakhstan  14 24  720 37 11.5  183 
Kyrgyz republic  .. ..  .. 44  12.0  140 
Uzbekistan  10 44  2550  35 13.5  195 
Ghana  5 21  822  29  13.0  552 
Uruguay  9 22  552  39  15.9  655 
East Asia & Pacific  6.9 23.9  885 31.5 52.7  477 
Europe & Central Asia  7.4 29.2  1450  31.5 15.0  409 
L. America & 
Caribbean 
7.3 22.2  1068  39.3 23.4  642 
Middle East & N. 
Africa 
7.1 27.1  923 41.6 17.7  606 
OECD  4.8 10.5  811 22.2 11.2  351 
South Asia  8.1 34.4  1236  38.7 26.4  969 
Sub-Saharan Africa  8.2 40.0  1561  38.1 42.2  581 
Source: Doing Business Data, World Bank (2006a). 
The process of acquiring land lease certificates has become a locus of corruption as well. 
Disputes and lawsuits involving leases are increasing, while disputes over the use of state 
pastures, especially in the more densely populated areas, are common. Since access to 
credit depends mainly on collateral in the form of immovable assets (land or buildings), 
problems with land registration and leases are a constraint to growth in urban and rural 
areas.  
 
Mongolia’s institutions for contract enforcement though weak are improving and are not 
a binding constraint to growth (Table 18). More than half of the firms surveyed expressed 
confidence in the ability of the judicial system to enforce their contractual and property 
rights in business disputes. However, only 10 percent of all firms have had disputes with 
clients or suppliers that had to be resolved in the judicial system, and of these firms 70 
percent indicate that the mechanisms for dispute resolution are a severe impediment to 
doing business.
61 Crime has been on the rise but does not appear to be a major obstacle to 
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growth in Mongolia. Less than 1 percent of firms considered it to be one of the three 
biggest obstacles to growth. Estimates suggest that on average, in 2004 firms’ losses due 
to crime added up to 1.6 percent of sales, higher than the average for East Asia (1 
percent).  
3.4 Not all constraints a country faces are “binding” 
As shown in section 3.3.1, low level of capacity utilization in Mongolian firms implies 
that infrastructure services other than transport can be improved but at present are not 
binding constraints to private sector growth in Mongolia. Other constraints to private 
sector growth that are not binding but need to be addressed in the future in order to 
sustain growth over the medium term are discussed next.  
3.4.1 Mismatch of skills 
While a high percentage of high skilled workers are employed in jobs well below their 
qualifications, over half of the large firms cite a shortage of skilled workers as a reason 
for not operating at full capacity. A third of the firms surveyed by the World Bank 
reported vacancies for professionals, and nearly two-fifths report vacancies for educated 
workers (World Bank 2007). Employers—especially large firms—complain about 
shortage of certain types of skills such as practical knowledge (e.g., English), technical 
knowledge (e.g., computers), and managerial, marketing and behavioral skills (work 
ethics and ability to work in teams).
62 The data on wages of different types of labor 
support these findings (Table 19).  
 
Table 19. Monthly average wages and salaries in 2006 (thousand tug) 
Legislators, senior officials and managers  195.8 
Professionals 152.2 
Technicians and associate professionals  132.2 
Clerks 93.4 
Service workers and shop and market sales workers  103.2 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  74.7 
Craft and related trades workers  130.8 
Plant and machine operators and assemblers  147.7 
Elementary occupations  91.3 
Average 128.5 
Source: Mongolia National Statistical Office. 
Poor quality jobs for skilled workers and underutilization of the skilled labor force are 
also problems in Mongolia. Although the labor market is relatively flexible,
63 high social 
security taxes and the fact that these are applicable only to permanent workers, tends to 
result in poor-quality job opportunities by increasing the share of contract and informal 
                                                                          
62 According to representatives from the Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency marketing 
knowledge and skills are critical to export growth.  
63 According to the Doing Business Database, and the Growth Competitiveness Index for 2005 minimum 
wages and firing costs are low, and temporary contracts are permitted in Mongolia.     35
jobs. Also, a high percentage of working age people between the ages of 25 and 29 are 
neither looking for jobs, nor are in school. These idle people, considered discouraged 
workers, have mostly upper secondary or tertiary education and live in urban areas. The 
country specific labor market incentive mechanisms on the supply and demand sides 
combined with evolving population dynamics need to be looked at in addressing this 
constraint over the long term. 
3.4.2 Environmental degradation and natural resource use  
The country and many of its people are dependent on natural resources such as 
grasslands, soils, forests, air and water, yet the quality of these is eroding even as their 
contributions to the public and shadow economies are increasing. Existing empirical and 
anecdotal evidence clearly indicates that illegal logging and wildlife trade, the mining 
sector, particularly artisanal mining, water and air pollution are responsible for the 
increasing economic costs of environmental degradation.  
3.4.3 Macroeconomic environment.  
 
Monetary and fiscal policies have insured macroeconomic stability in recent years and 
have not been a constraint to growth. In 2005 inflationary pressures accelerated due to a 
rise in fuel and meat prices and administrative price adjustments in utilities. Given the 
windfall revenues the Government is currently reaping due to the surge in international 
mineral prices and the changing structure of the real economy towards a highly 
concentrated production and export base in mining and livestock sectors, the key 
challenge will be to maintain macro-stability over the long-term and reduce the 
economy’s vulnerability to international commodity price fluctuations. The harsh 
weather, that has in the past extinguished a third of the country’s total livestock herd in 
one year (in 2000-01), makes management of this volatility even more difficult.   
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The analysis presented here, and the “binding constraints” we have arrived at, constitute 
only a first step in looking at what it will take for Mongolia to continue its current high 
levels of economic growth. The next step is to look more in depth at country-specific 
factors and policies that need to be implemented over the short to medium term. In-depth 
sectoral expertise, country knowledge and policy analysis are needed in order to judge 
which specific policies to propose, under what scenarios and, of these, which are 
politically feasible at the time to implement without derailing the momentum for reform 
in the country. A look at sectoral strategies, results of appropriate stakeholder 
surveys/political analyses, and micro-level sectoral diagnostics (such as investment 
climate assessments and public expenditure reviews) will provide an essential supplement 
in arriving at an informed decision in this regard. Finally, in a rapidly growing economy 
like Mongolia, or for any growth process for that matter, as one constraint is lifted, 
another will emerge and become “binding” for economic growth (Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Pritchett, 2004). Therefore, the growth diagnostic should be revisited in order to ensure 
that policies in place service the growth objectives of governments.   36
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